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Abstract
Inductive reasoning requires exploiting links between evidence and hypotheses. This can be
done focusing either on the posterior probability of the hypothesis when updated on the new evi-
dence or on the impact of the new evidence on the credibility of the hypothesis. But are these two
cognitive representations equally reliable? This study investigates this question by comparing
probability and impact judgments on the same experimental materials. The results indicate that
impact judgments are more consistent in time and more accurate than probability judgments.
Impact judgments also predict the direction of errors in probability judgments. These findings sug-
gest that human inductive reasoning relies more on estimating evidential impact than on posterior
probability.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Posterior probability and evidential impact
Humans’ spectacular ability to draw inferences from limited information underpins per-
ception, categorization, prediction, diagnostic reasoning, and scientific discovery. Such
inferences are inductive because they venture beyond the information given to draw conclu-
sions that are probable given the available evidence but are not logically implied by it.
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